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Abstract:
Traditional aid conditionality has been attacked as ineffective in part because aid agencies
– notably the World Bank – often fail to enforce conditions.  This pattern undermines the credibility
of  conditionality,  weakening  incentives  to  implement  policy  reforms.    The  standard  critique
attributes this time inconsistency to bureaucratic factors within the aid agency such as pressure to
lend, defensive lending, or short-sighted altruism.  Pressure from powerful donors provides another
potential explanation for lax enforcement.  This paper presents an empirical analysis of the political
economy of conditionality enforcement in international organizations using the case of the World
Bank and the United States.  The analysis examines panel data on World Bank disbursements to 97
countries receiving structural adjustment loans between 1984 and 2005.  Using macroeconomic
variables to measure compliance and UN voting as an indicator of alignment with the U.S., this
paper presents evidence that the World Bank enforces structural adjustment conditions more
vigorously in countries not aligned with the United States.
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I.  Introduction
Traditional aid conditionality has been attacked as ineffective in part because aid agencies
– notably the World Bank – often fail to enforce conditions (Mosley et al., 1995; Collier, 1997;
Dreher, 2004).  This pattern undermines the credibility of conditionality, weakening developing
country governments’ incentives to implement policy reforms.  The standard critique attributes this
time inconsistency to bureaucratic factors within the aid agency such as pressure to meet lending
targets, defensive lending to promote repayment of past loans, or short-sighted altruism (Svensson,
2003).  Yet the cost for the aid agency of lax enforcement is high since it fuels expectations that
other conditions – across the agency’s portfolio – also will not be enforced and hence broadly
undermines compliance.
Pressure from powerful donors with geopolitical or commercial interests in the recipient
country provides another potential explanation for lax enforcement of aid conditions (as suggested
in  Kanbur,  2000).    This  paper  presents  an  empirical  analysis  of  the  political  economy  of
conditionality enforcement in international organizations using the case of the World Bank and the
United States.  Because project-level disbursement data are not publically available for World Bank
lending, the analysis examines overall World Bank disbursements when structural adjustment loans
(SALs) are active using a panel of 97 countries from 1984 to 2005.  I use macroeconomic variables
to measure compliance with typical structural adjustment conditions.  Data are widely available only
for two relevant variables, inflation and the percentage change in the official exchange rate.   I
interact these variables with a measure of U.S. geopolitical interests to investigate the hypothesis
that  the  World  Bank  responds  to  U.S.  pressure  to  disburse  SALs  to  U.S.-friendly  countries2
regardless of compliance with loan conditions.  The U.S. interest variable is a measure of UN voting
alignment similar to Andersen, Harr and Tarp (2006).  It reflects countries making concessions to
the U.S., i.e., deviating from their normal voting position toward the U.S. position on votes that the
U.S. considers important.  The fixed effects estimation finds that compliance variables have a
significant link to disbursements when countries are not aligned with the U.S. but no significant or
substantial effect when countries are aligned with the U.S. This is consistent with the donor pressure
explanation of lax enforcement.
Understanding the reasons for non-enforcement of conditions is important as they may
influence the success of efforts to reform international organizations.  Many reform proposals focus
on changing bureaucratic incentives (e.g., linking pay and promotion to outcomes) or on reducing
institutional  information  and  commitment  problems  (e.g.,  aid  tournaments  as  suggested  by
Pietrobelli and Scarpa (1992) and Svensson (2003)).  Such reforms may have significant merit but
do not address the issue of donor pressure directly and hence could yield smaller gains and be more
difficult  to  implement  than  expected.    Other  reforms  that  restrict  direct  donor  influence  in
international financial institutions (IFIs) – changes in governance, donor financing, and perhaps
headquarters location – also need to be considered.
II.  Background
Many argue that World Bank structural adjustment conditions have not been enforced:  The
World Bank sets macroeconomic and institutional reforms as conditions for releasing funds from
a SAL, the recipient government fails to satisfy these conditions, and the World Bank releases funds
anyway (Mosley et al., 1995; Killick, 1995; Kanbur, 2000).  A number of explanations have been
offered for this behavior.  Svensson (2000) develops the Samaritan’s dilemma explanation where
conditionality enforcement is not credible because the donor prefers to provide aid in all cases.3
Others suggest bureaucratic pressures including a “pressure to lend” to advance loan officers’
careers and “defensive lending” to ensure repayment of past loans (Mosely et al., 1995; Martens et
al., 2002).  Finally, donor pressure is suggested by Kanbur (2000) and modeled by Mavrotas and
Villanger (2006).  As Kanbur (2000, p. 415) puts it:
But in other instances it is, again only apparently paradoxically, in the donor’s direct
self interest not to impose the sanction of aid withdrawal when conditionality is
violated.  The most obvious case of this is political clientelism.  How else can one
explain the repeated [World Bank] tranche releases to Zaire and Senegal in the 1980s
and early 1990s, for example, despite continued failure to comply with adjustment
conditionality, except in terms of pressure from the US and the French?
In this paper, I pursue this aspect of structural adjustment – the impact of donor interests on
World Bank SAL disbursement.  I focus on U.S. interests since the U.S. is the single most influential
member of the World Bank and data on U.S. interests are more widely available.  A number of
researchers have explored the impact of donor interests on IFIs, including the IMF (Andersen, Harr
and Tarp, 2006; Dreher and Jensen, 2007; Harrigan et al., 2006; Stone, 2002, 2004; Thacker, 1999;
Vreeland, 2005), the World Bank (Andersen, Hansen and Markussen, 2006; Fleck and Kilby, 2006;
Frey and Schneider, 1986; Harrigan et al., 2006) and regional development banks (Kilby, 2006).
The current paper follows most closely Vreeland (2005) and Stone (2002, 2004) in spirit.
Vreeland (2005) examines two views of the IMF:  “IMF as scapegoat” and “IMF as U.S.
piggy bank” (my terms, not Vreeland’s).  In the scapegoat camp, many at the IMF and elsewhere
claim that Fund programs serve as a commitment device.  Reform-minded politicians in IMF
program countries can deflect popular criticism of the short-term hardships of stabilization onto the
IMF and hence remain in power and stay the course.  To the extent that the policies promoted are4
in the country’s long run interests, the IMF is a useful scapegoat.  Vreeland points out that this
function could be particularly important for a recipient government when its administration has
limited power, e.g., in a system with multiple veto players.  In the “IMF as U.S. piggy bank” view,
international  politics  influence  IMF  lending  decisions.    Countries  friendly  with  the  U.S.  get
preferential access to IMF funds.  Vreeland notes that the IMF can only serve as scapegoat when it
can credibly threaten to withhold funds, e.g., in countries where it is not providing funds at the
behest of the U.S.
To test these theories, Vreeland examines the probability that countries enter into an IMF
agreement.  Ceteris paribus, this probability is significantly higher for countries with more veto
players and for countries moving toward the U.S. position in UN voting.  However, the interaction
of these two variables enters with a negative sign, suggesting that the scapegoat function is less
important for countries friendly with the U.S.  This supports the view that the effectiveness of
conditionality is undermined by pressure from powerful donors.
Looking at IMF lending in Africa, Stone (2004) comes to a similar conclusion: the IMF fails
to enforce its conditions fully when major donor countries interfere.  The duration of program
interruptions – the key indicator of IMF enforcement – is shorter for countries that are important to
major donors (the U.S., France or the U.K.).  Measures of importance include the volume of bilateral
aid, the strength of post-colonial ties, and UN voting alignment.  Stone (2002) reports similar results
for Eastern European countries during the post-communist transition period.  Overall, conditionality
is less effective, program interruptions are more frequent (though shorter), and private capital less
responsive in larger countries that were more important to major IMF donors.
This paper presents the first econometric study of the impact of donor interests on the
disbursement of World Bank structural adjustment loans.  To address the question directly, one5
would like to have the difference between planned and actual SAL tranche disbursements, the ex
ante policy reform/macroeconomic conditions for each tranche release, the values of these variables
at the planned and actual times of tranche release, and measures of the borrowing country’s
importance to the U.S.  In practice, little of this data is systematically available outside the World
Bank.  We do know when countries were under World Bank structural adjustment programs.  Data
on disbursements are not available by loan but are available by country from the OECD DAC
International Development Statistics.  We do not know specific conditions on individual loans but
several variables are key indicators in structural adjustment programs.  In the empirical section, I
focus on the two relevant indicators with widely available data, inflation and exchange rates.  I
include a measure of UN voting alignment to capture U.S. interests.
Since this test is necessarily indirect, it is useful to trace out the indirect impact of the
hypothesis and to explore what other factors might influence the results.  The variable of interest is
the difference between actual and planned World Bank SAL disbursements to country i in year t
whereas the available data are overall World Bank disbursements (SAL plus project disbursements)
to country i in year t.  The next section starts with the former to derive an equation in terms of the
latter.
III. Conditionality Enforcement Equation
Our starting point is to examine what percent of a SAL tranche disburses.  If the conditions
of the SAL are fully met, 100% should disburse regardless of other factors.  If conditions are not
fully met, a political economy perspective suggests that the percent disbursed may depend both on
the degree of slippage and on whether the borrower is important to a powerful donor, in this case
the U.S.  Define   as actual SAL disbursements to country i in year t and   as planned SAL
disbursements to country i in year t (i.e., the scheduled tranche).  Conditionality “slippage” is given1For simplicity, I take  $0, i.e., a country’s macroeconomic performance is never
substantially better than the conditions specified in the SAL agreement.
2Original commitments refer to the loan amount specified in SAL agreements for all on-
going SALs during year t rather than just commitments for new programs in year t.  Some
percentage of this amount is intended to disburse each year, e.g., one third each year in 3 year SALs.
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by   where   is the value of some macroeconomic variable (e.g., fiscal deficit) and 
is the upper limit specified in SAL documents.
1  With this notation, we can write the disbursement
percentage as a function of conditionality slippage and borrower importance:
 =  (1)
One convenient form for this function is:
 =  (2)
where  <0 and  >0.  For simplicity, consider the case where   is an indicator variable equal
to 1 if the borrower is a U.S. friend, 0 if not.  In this case, it makes sense that  # or equivalently
+ #0.  This specification yields  =1 when there is no slippage ( =0); the tranche
is fully disbursed.  With slippage ( >0), there are two possible cases.  If the borrower is not a
U.S. friend, the exponent  is negative and  <1.  If the borrower is a U.S. friend, the
exponent   is greater (less negative) so that   is greater.  If U.S. friends face
no enforcement of conditions,  =0 and  =1 regardless of the value of  .
Taking logs of both sides and rearranging yields
 =    (3)
This equation includes two unobserved right-hand side variables,   and  .  I assume 
is proportional to original commitments ( = ,  0(0,1]) and take   as a constant,  .
2
This gives
 =  (4)3Original commitments for projects refer to the loan amounts for on-going projects, rather
than commitments made for new projects during year t.
4Factors influencing implementation speed that also vary over time contribute to the error
term.  This raises the possibility of within-country autocorrelation; to allow for this, I use panel
corrected standard errors (i.e., heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors via
clustering on countries) and estimate an AR1 process in Table 6.
5OECD (2007) excludes former Part II and CEEC/NIS countries per new OECD DAC
classification guidelines.  I use earlier data from OECD (2006) for these countries.
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where  =   and  =  >0.  The left-hand side variable, SAL disbursements ( ),
is also unobserved.  Instead, we have disbursements at the country level, the sum of SAL and project
disbursements ( ).  Project disbursements depend on original project commitments
( ) and country-specific characteristics that influence the speed of project implementation.
3  To
account for this, we replace   by  , replace   by  / , and include country fixed
effects.
4  Our estimating equation, allowing for unexplained variation in disbursements, is
 =  (5)
The central implications of the model developed are that  <0,  >0 and  + #0.
IV. Data
The dependent variable (World Bank disbursements  ) is the sum of gross disbursements
from the IDA and the IBRD to  country i in year t.  Data come from the International Development
Statistics CD-ROM (OECD, 2006, 2007) deflated to constant 2005 U.S. dollars in millions.
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Commitment data are from the World Bank Projects Database (World Bank, 2007A), also deflated
to constant 2005 U.S. dollars in millions (using year t rather than the original commitment year).
These are “original commitments” as defined above, i.e., the sum of the original loan amounts for
all loans that are on-going in country i during year t.
To proxy for  , I draw on the World Development Indicators (WDI) for macroeconomic6WDI data on the previous year’s fiscal deficit to GDP ratio are available for only 324
observations and 56 countries between 1991 and 2005 in the estimation sample.  The in-sample
correlation between inflation and the previous year’s deficit to GDP ratio is 0.27.  A regression of
inflation on the lagged deficit using the same sample yields a coefficient of 1.
7I use the previous year because UN votes take place in the last quarter of the calendar year
while World Bank disbursements happen throughout the year (peaking at the end of the fiscal year
in June).  Results are very similar using contemporaneous votes.  The voting alignment calculation
is the same as in Kilby (2006) and closely follows Thacker (1999) and Dreher and Jensen (2007).
For each vote, a country scores a 1 if it follows the U.S., a 0.5 if it abstains or is absent when the
U.S. votes (or vice versa), and a 0 if it opposes the U.S.  A country’s alignment is its mean score for
the year and is calculated separately for all votes and for “important” votes.  In their analyses of U.S.
influence, Thacker (1999) and Vreeland (2005) use movement toward the U.S. position over time;
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variables that may capture the degree of compliance with structural adjustment conditions.  While
the WDI contains a number of relevant indicators, only two, inflation and the official exchange rate,
are available for a wide range of countries and over the full time period.  Inflation (the annual
increase in consumer prices) may also reflect the government’s fiscal deficit in the previous year.
6
I use the official exchange rate (local currency units per dollar, annual average) to construct the
percent change from one year to the next.  Since devaluation (an increase in the exchange rate as
defined here) is often a condition of structural adjustment loans, this variable is analogous to 
in equation (5).
The measure of U.S. friendship ( ) is derived from UN voting in the previous year.
Andersen, Harr and Tarp (2006) take the overall voting record as the country’s ideal point.  The
distance between that point and the country’s voting on issues designated as important by U.S. State
Department then reflects concessions to the U.S.  I operationalize this by calculating distance as the
difference between the country’s alignment with the U.S. on “important” UN votes and its alignment
with the U.S. on all UN votes.  Country i is a U.S. friend in year t if it made concessions to the U.S.
position the previous year, i.e., if it was more closely aligned with the U.S. on “important” UN votes
than on all UN votes.
7this paper and Andersen, Harr and Tarp (2006) use movement toward the U.S. position based on
issues rather than time.  Data on all UN votes are from Voeten (2004); data on UN votes designated
as important for the U.S. are from U.S. State Department (1983-2006).
8A SAL is indicated by LENDING INSTRUMENT TYPE equal to “DEVELOPMENT
POLICY LENDING”.
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Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the estimation sample.  The sample covers the period
1984 to 2005, the starting year set by the start of State Department UN voting data and the ending
year set by the latest available OECD DAC disbursement data and WDI macro data.  Coverage is
limited to observations with on-going World Bank-funded SALs as indicated in the World Bank
Projects Database.
8  World Bank disbursements averaged $289 million in constant 2005 dollars,
ranging from a low of $358,000 to Panama in 1993 to a high of $4.6 billion to Mexico in 1990.  The
average  of  the  natural  log  of  disbursements  is  4.78  ($119  million).    World  Bank  original
commitments (as defined above) averaged $1.9 billion in constant 2005 dollars, ranging from a low
of $6.4 million to Dominica in 2004 to a high of $30.5 billion to India in 1991.  The average of the
natural  log  of  original  commitments  was  6.7  ($812  million).    Eighty-seven  percent  of  the
observations were for U.S. friends.  Inflation averaged 35.4%, ranging from deflation of 17.6% in
Equatorial Guinea in 1986 (the year after adopting the CFA franc) to inflation of 3,079.8% in
Argentina in 1989.  For U.S. friends, the average inflation rate was 33.4% with the same range as
inflation overall.  The percentage change in the official exchange rate averaged 57.7%, with a low
of -22.9% in several CFA franc countries (Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, Côte
d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Niger, Senegal, and Togo) driven by appreciation of the French franc
against the U.S. dollar in 1986 and a high of 13,932% in Bolivia in 1985.  For U.S. friends, the
average was 54.3% with the same range as overall.  These figures illustrate that mean inflation and
exchange rate values do not differ substantially between U.S. friends and other countries receiving9A Hausman test fails to reject the null hypothesis of random effects against the alternative
of fixed effects (p=0.5975) so this is a route one could take if there were time invariant country-
specific characteristics of interest.
10There are 44 additional data points with zero disbursements that are not included in the
sample.  This proves to be too few to estimate a selection model or a meaningful probit.  Results
from a tobit analysis (replacing log of 0 with a small number and setting the tobit lower limit just
below the log of the lowest actual positive value) are virtually the same as those reported though
10
World Bank SALs.
Table 2 presents simple correlations between the variables in the estimation sample.  As one
would expect, there is a very high correlation (almost 0.9) between disbursements and original
commitments, with only cancellations, varying speeds of disbursements, and compositional effects
keeping the correlation below 1.  The next highest correlation (0.35) is between the lagged percent
change in exchange rate and the current inflation rate.  The positive correlation is consistent with
the inflationary effects of devaluation yet low enough that these variables may capture different
effects.    At  0.0865  and  0.107,  the  correlations  of  inflation  with  disbursements  and  original
commitments are moderate in size.  All other correlations are small.
V. Estimation Results
This section presents results from panel estimation with country fixed effects.  The statistics
reported are based on heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors unless otherwise
noted, though the results are generally not sensitive to the method used (standard, sandwich-type,
or bootstrap).  All specifications include a time trend (generally insignificant); results are virtually
identical if the trend is replaced by annual dummies.  A Hausman test strongly rejects the null
hypothesis of no country fixed effects although results are qualitatively the same without fixed
effects.
9  All specifications using the full sample explain between 25 and 35 percent of the time
series variation in the data.
10without fixed effects.
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Column 1 of Table 3 gives estimation results for a basic specification that includes original
commitments, inflation and percent change in the official exchange rate.  The estimated coefficient
on commitments is highly significant and statistically indistinguishable from 1.  One percent larger
commitments are associated with approximately one percent higher disbursements, consistent with
the coefficient on   in equation (5) of Section III.  Inflation enters with a negative sign as
expected (e.g., if higher fiscal deficits both violate conditionality and generate inflation); however,
the coefficient is estimated with a large standard error and is not statistically different from zero.
The percentage change in exchange rate enters with an unexpected negative sign but again the
standard error is very large and the coefficient estimate is not statistically significant.  Column 2
adds US friend.  The estimated coefficient has the expected positive sign but is also insignificant.
The other coefficient estimates do not change substantially.
Column 3 is the benchmark specification with interactions between the US friend dummy
variable and the macroeconomic indicators.  The estimated coefficient on inflation remains negative
but increases an order of magnitude in absolute value and is statistically significant.  The estimated
coefficient on the inflation interaction term is positive, significant and nearly the same magnitude
as the coefficient on inflation.  A Wald test fails to reject the hypothesis that the two coefficients
sum to zero (p=0.4951), i.e.,  + = 0 in equation (5).  Thus, for countries that are not U.S. friends,
higher inflation is associated with lower disbursements.  For countries that are U.S. friends, there
is no link between inflation and disbursements.  Putting this in dollar terms, for non-U.S. friends,
a one standard deviation increase in inflation (193 %) is associated  with  $89 million lower
disbursements (evaluated at the mean of the log of disbursements).  A smaller increase in inflation,
say 20%, is associated with $16 million lower disbursements while a one percent increase in11The numbers are larger if we use average disbursements ($289 million) rather than the
average of the log ($119 million) as the latter downplays large disbursements.  In this case, the
figures work out to be $216 million, $39 million, and $2 million.
12Again using the average of disbursements as in the footnote above, the figures rise to $137
million, $21 million, and $0.4 million.
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inflation works out to just under $1 million lower disbursements.
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We see a similar pattern with the exchange rate.  The estimated coefficient on % ) exchange
rate becomes positive and is statistically significant.  The estimated coefficient on the exchange rate-
U.S. friend interaction term is negative, significant and nearly the same magnitude as the coefficient
on % ) exchange rate.  Again, a Wald test fails to reject the hypothesis that the two coefficients sum
to zero (p=0.6641).  For countries that are not U.S. friends, a devaluation of their currency (as
reflected in the percent increase in the official local currency units per dollar exchange rate) is
associated with higher disbursements.  For countries that are U.S. friends, devaluation is not linked
to disbursements.  Put more directly in terms of conditionality, when countries are not U.S. friends,
disbursements are lower when they fail to devalue their currency.  When countries are U.S. friends,
disbursements are unrelated to whether or not they devalue.  In dollar terms, for non-U.S. friends,
a one standard deviation decrease in % ) exchange rate (4.93) is associated with  $57 million lower
disbursements.  A smaller decrease (say from the sample mean of 0.577 to no change) is associated
with $9 million lower disbursements while a one percent decrease in % ) exchange rate works out
to $0.2 million lower disbursements.
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These results are fairly robust along a number of dimensions.  Table 4 presents three
alternative specifications.  Column 1 omits exchange rate variables.  The estimated coefficients for
inflation are somewhat smaller in magnitude than before (possible because devaluation in year t!1
is correlated with high – though falling – inflation in year t) but the general pattern remains.  Higher13The GDP variable is the log of PPP GDP per capita in constant 2005 dollars (World Bank,
2007B).  Population is the log of the country’s population (World Bank, 2007B).  Trade is the log
of exports plus imports in millions of 2005 dollars, lagged one year to reduce the chance of
endogeneity (IMF 2006). The polity rating is “polity2” from the Polity IV Project (2005) with
interpolation during periods of governmental transition.  The governmental transition dummy
captures these periods.  The conflict dummy equals 1 for countries involved in internal conflicts with
at least 1000 deaths in that year (Gleditsch et al., 2002).  The post-conflict dummy equals 1 if the
country emerged from conflict (as defined above) in the last five years.  The number of people killed
by natural disaster is in thousands (EM-DAT, 2007).  Most aid allocation studies include GDP and
population, typically as indicators of recipient need.  Trade also enters a number of analyses of the
World Bank and other donors (e.g., Fleck and Kilby, 2006).  Polity is frequently included in the
analysis of bilateral aid; recently, researchers have begun to include democracy in multilateral
estimations as a proxy for good institutions (e.g., Dollar and Levin, 2006).  The governmental
transition dummy was introduced by Kang and Meernik (2004).  Canavire et al. (2005), Collier and
Hoeffler (2004), and Kang and Meernik (2004) all examine aid allocation in post-conflict situations.
Drury et al. (2005) and Eisensee and Strömberg (2007) consider the impact of natural disasters on
aid.
14Only the post-conflict variable is significantly related to disbursements once we control for
original commitments and this only at the 10 % level.  This variable may reflect rapid disbursements
from the World Bank’s Post-Conflict Fund that started in 1997 though the variable is generally
insignificant in sub-samples.  Results are the same including each of these additional variables
individually.  Other than trade, these additional variables arguably reflect humanitarian factors that
the Samaritan’s dilemma would link to less enforcement and hence higher disbursements.  Six of
eight have the expected sign but only post-conflict is even marginally significant.  Thus, this
specification provides scant support for the Samaritan’s dilemma explanation of lax enforcement
of World Bank structural adjustment conditions.
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inflation is linked to significantly lower disbursements only when countries are not U.S. friends.
Column 2 omits inflation.  Again, the magnitude of the effect is reduced but the pattern remains with
exchange rate policy having no apparent effect on disbursements in U.S.-friendly countries.  Column
3 goes the other direction, presenting the results of a “kitchen sink” regression.  This specification
has both inflation and exchange rates but adds a number of variables considered in past aid
allocation studies.  These include GDP per capita, population, trade, the autocracy/democracy polity
rating, a governmental transition dummy, a major conflict dummy, a post-conflict dummy, and the
number killed by natural disasters.
13  While these variables may influence the level of commitments,
they matter relatively little for disbursements once we control for commitments.
14  Most importantly,14
the estimated coefficients for inflation and exchange rates change very little with these additional
control variables.
Table 5 presents results for the benchmark specification estimated with various sub-samples.
Column 1 includes only countries from Sub-Saharan Africa, the region with the most countries (34).
The sample size falls to 462 observations (an average of 14 annual observations per country).  As
before, original commitments are strongly linked to disbursements with a coefficient point estimate
greater than one but statistically indistinguishable from one (p=0.2321).  US friend enters with an
unexpected negative sign but is not statistically significant.  The inflation and exchange rate
variables enter with the same signs as in the overall sample, again suggesting that the World Bank
enforces macroeconomic conditions of structural adjustment programs in countries that are not U.S.
friends but not in those that are.  For African countries that are not U.S. friends, disbursements are
lower when inflation is higher and when the local currency has been devalued less.  For countries
that are U.S. friends, the effects (the sum of the direct and interaction terms) are not statistically
significant (p=0.7259 for inflation and p=0.4811 for % ) exchange rate).
The results for Latin America and the Carribean in Column 2 are based on a much smaller
sample (260 observation on 22 countries, an average of 12 years per country).  The story is much
the  same  as  before  for  inflation  with  consumer  price  increases  having  a  negative  link  with
disbursements only in countries that are not U.S. friends.  The percentage change in the exchange
rate, however, enters with a negative sign for countries not friendly with the U.S.  For all types of
Latin American countries (U.S. friends and others), the exchange rate effect is not significant.
Whether these results are due to devaluation playing a less central role in Latin  American
adjustment programs or due to the smaller sample size is an open question.
Column 3 includes all other countries from the larger sample.  All estimated coefficients15The  trend  terms  indicate  that  the  disbursement  rate  slowed  in  the  first  period  and
accelerated  in  the  second  period,  consistent  with  the  performance  crisis  of  the  early  1990s
(Wapenhans, 1992).
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have the expected signs and magnitudes are roughly similar to estimates from the overall sample.
The one interesting difference is that the Wald test does reject the null hypothesis that the exchange
rate coefficients sum to zero.  U.S. friends that failed devalue their currency face some sanctions,
albeit less than those imposed on non-U.S. friends.
Columns 4 and 5 divide the sample period in half to see if conditionality enforcement
patterns changed over time.  In particular, this tests whether a single event rather than a general
practice is responsible for the apparent pattern of conditionality enforcement.  Column 4 covers the
1984 to 1994 period which includes 487 observations on 76 adjusting countries, an average of 6
annual observations per country.  The results mirror those for the sample as a whole, the only
notable difference being a slightly larger coefficient on % ) exchange rate.  Column 5 covers the
1995 to 2005 period, 600 observations on 83 countries, an average of 7 annual observations per
country.  Again, estimates closely follow those for the overall period.  As expected given the results
for 1984-1994, the coefficient estimate for % ) exchange rate is somewhat smaller.  In addition, we
again reject the null hypothesis that the % ) exchange rate coefficients sum to zero so that U.S.
friends face reduced but not zero sanctions for failing to devalue.
15  These results support the
selective enforcement of conditionality as a general pattern, not driven by isolated events.
Table 6 presents results for AR1 and dynamic panel specifications.  Column 1 is estimated
via feasible generalized least squares allowing for an error term with first order autocorrelation and
country fixed effects, the efficient estimator if the error process follows an AR1.  Although the
estimated autocorrelation parameter is D=0.2576, none of the coefficients or standard errors of
interest changes substantially.  Column 2 presents a dynamic panel allowing the lagged dependent16
variable to enter the equation (again with HAC standard errors).  The estimated coefficient on lagged
disbursements enters as positive but small and statistically insignificant.  Other coefficients change
only marginally with no change in interpretation.  However, the least squares estimator is known
to be inconsistent in a dynamic panel with the resulting bias concentrated in the estimated coefficient
for the lagged dependent variable (Judson and Owen, 1999).  Hence, Column 3 reports an Arellano-
Bond one step GMM estimation with robust standard errors.  The estimated coefficient on the lagged
dependent variable does change sign (switching from positive to negative) but remains insignificant,
and other coefficient estimates are very close to those in the benchmark specification (Table 3,
Column 3).
Table 7 addresses the influence of outliers and an alternative definition of the U.S. friend
variable.  As is apparent from the Table 1 descriptive statistics, the sample includes some extreme
values.  To further illuminate this point, Figures 1 to 3 present frequency distributions for key
variables.  Figure 1 is a histogram for the log disbursement ratio, the natural log of disbursements
as a fraction of original commitments.  The distribution is notably asymmetric with a long left-hand
tail extending well beyond !4.  Figure 2 is a histogram of inflation.  A long right-hand tail includes
several values above 10 (1000% inflation).  Figure 3 is a histogram of the percent change in the
official exchange rate.  Repeating the pattern for inflation, we see a long right-hand side tail
extending well past 10.  To assess the influence of these outliers on the results presented earlier,
Column 1 of Table 7 excludes these extreme values, i.e., all observations with log disbursement ratio
less than !4, inflation values greater than 10, or exchange rate changes greater than 10.  These
restrictions reduce the sample by 30 observations and there are some notable changes in the size and
standard errors of the coefficient estimates.  However, in broad terms, the earlier results persist.
Though somewhat smaller, there is still a strong positive link between disbursements and original16Using the continuous measure of U.S. friendship directly results in a similar pattern as with
the basic US friend dummy, i.e., the coefficients on interaction terms have the opposite sign from
the non-interaction terms indicating lax enforcement for U.S. friends.  The same holds if I use
alignment on important UN votes (rather than the deviation of this variable from alignment on all
votes) or a dummy variable based on this measure.
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commitments.  For countries that are not U.S. friends, higher inflation and low devaluation are
linked to lower disbursements while the impact, if any, is much smaller for U.S. friends.
Column 2 of Table 7 introduces an additional U.S. friend variable, strong US friend, which
equals 1 if the UN concessions variable is greater than the mean value of 0.15.  Because this
specification includes both US friend and strong US friend dummies, the estimated coefficients are
additive.  For example, the impact of being a (regular) U.S. friend on the marginal inflation effect
is 0.685 while the equivalent figure for a strong U.S. friend is 0.685+0.021=0.706.  The key finding
here is that the previous results are largely unaffected.  While the difference in conditionality
enforcement between U.S. friends and non-U.S. friends is larger for those countries making the most
concessions to the U.S. (the strong U.S. friends), it is not driven exclusively by this sub-group.
Likewise, the difference does not mask some reversal among those making the largest concessions
to the U.S.  This demonstrates that the results are robust to an alternate definition of U.S. friend.
16
Finally,  Table  8  presents  estimates  for  cases  without  structural  adjustment  lending.
Disbursements now reflect only project lending where the main focus is on a concrete activity rather
than on conditionality and broad policy change.  If the previous results reflect the impact of selective
conditionality enforcement on disbursements, we expect to see very different results here.  This is
indeed the case.  The link between commitments and disbursements is much tighter as reflected in
a coefficient very close to one and very precisely estimated.  The looser (though still strong) link
between commitments and disbursements for SALs most likely reflects the greater frequency of
cancellations and long delays.  The estimated coefficients on inflation indicate a negative link with17Including only commitments, the R
2 is 0.38; including only the macroeconomic variables,
the R
2 is 0.02.
18It is also possible that SAL conditions are less stringent for U.S. friends.  However, the
dynamics of the analysis are better suited to detecting lax enforcement than to detecting less
stringent conditions.  It is doubtful that official conditions could be so different between the groups
that they would explain fully the effects found.
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disbursements for U.S. friends but no impact for countries not friendly with the U.S.  Estimated
without the interaction term, the overall link between inflation and disbursements is negative.
Devaluation has a marginally significant negative link with disbursements with no significant
difference between U.S. friendly and unfriendly countries.  Not only are these estimates radically
different from those for the SAL sample, they are not particularly stable and the variables of interest
explain only a very small portion of the variation.
17
VI.  Conclusion
This paper presents indirect evidence that pressure from the U.S. has undermined World
Bank enforcement of structural adjustment conditionality.  For countries not friendly with the U.S.
(countries that do not make concessions to the U.S. position in important UN votes), there does
appear to be a significant degree of enforcement.  When these countries have active World Bank
structural adjustment loans, poor macro policy is associated with lower disbursements and the effect
can be substantial.  For countries that are friendly with the U.S., there is no such evidence of
enforcement. For this second group, disbursements are not systematically related to macro policy.
18
This pattern reoccurs in a range of specifications, across geographic regions, and over different time
periods and is robust to a number of estimation methods.  In contrast, no similar pattern is found
when SALs are not active, again indicating that the pattern is driven by selective enforcement of
structural adjustment conditionality.19
These results highlight donor pressure as an important alternate explanation for the failure
of conditionality, one that merits more attention from researchers and reformers.  This issue has been
explored empirically in the context of the IMF (Stone, 2002, 2004; Vreeland, 2005) but not
previously for the World Bank. 
Why does it matter what is the cause of conditionality slippage?  Efforts to reform structural
adjustment have focused increasingly on selectivity to change bureaucratic incentives, reduce
problems of information and commitment, and promote ownership of programs (largely through the
PRSP process).  These reforms may have significant merit but do not address the issue of donor
pressure that can, as before, undermine borrower incentives and World Bank credibility.  Other more
fundamental reforms that aim to reduce donor influence – changes in World Bank governance,
ending the tradition of allowing the U.S. to select the World Bank president, developing alternative
sources or methods of funding – also need to be explored.20
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Units/Scale                    
World Bank disbursements 289.046 472.681 0.358 4606.435 2005 US$ millions
log of World Bank disbursements 4.780 1.415 -1.027 8.435 log of 2005 US $ millions
World Bank commitments 1,931.626 3,211.700 6.400 30,517.760 2005 US$ millions
log of World Bank commitments 6.704 1.311 1.856 10.326 log of 2005 US $ millions
US friend 0.872 0.335 0 1 0/1
inflation 0.354 1.932 -0.176 30.798 decimal (1=100%)
US friend * inflation 0.334 1.933 -0.176 30.798 decimal (1=100%)
% ) exchange rate 0.577 4.931 -0.229 139.319 decimal (1=100%)
US friend * % ) exchange rate 0.543 4.922 -0.229 139.319 decimal (1=100%)
N = 1098 observations
n = 97 countries
T = 2 to 22 year, mean of 11 years
Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics24
log of World Bank disbursements
log of World Bank commitments
US friend
inflation
% ) exchange rate
log of World Bank disbursements 1
log of World Bank commitments 0.897 1
US friend 0.0374 0.0316 1
inflation 0.0865 0.107 0.0428 1
% ) exchange rate -0.0126 -0.0087 0.0243 0.3519 1
N = 1098
Table 2:  Simple Correlations25
Dependent Variable:  World Bank disbursements
(1) (2) (3)
World Bank commitments 1.044*** 1.034*** 0.985***
(10.75) (10.94) (10.03)
US friend 0.0842 0.0199
(1.47) (0.30)




% ) exchange rate -0.000987 -0.00102 0.131***
(-0.16) (-0.16) (6.31)
% ) exchange rate*US friend -0.133***
(-5.83)
year 0.00293 0.00381 0.00202
(0.64) (0.86) (0.49)
R
2 0.2633 0.2648 0.2722
N = 1098 observations
n = 97 countries
T = 2 to 22 year with an average of 11 years
Estimated with country fixed effects.
Disbursements and commitments are log of constant 2005 dollars.
z statistics in parentheses based on HAC standard errors.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 3:  Basic Specifications26
Dependent Variable:  World Bank disbursements
(1) (2) (3)
World Bank commitments 1.000*** 1.036*** 0.983***
(10.50) (10.99) (9.87)




inflation*US friend 0.521* 0.693**
(2.17) (3.03)
% ) exchange rate 0.0735** 0.124***
(2.94) (5.16)
% ) exchange rate*US friend -0.0759** -0.127***
(-2.95) (-5.05)
















year 0.00234 0.00429 -0.00238
(0.56) (0.98) (-0.15)
N 1098 1098 1096
R
2 0.2685 0.2656 0.2798
n = 97 countries
T = 2 to 22 year with an average of 11 years
Estimated with country fixed effects.
Disbursements, commitments, and trade (exports plus imports) are log
of constant 2005 millions of dollars.  GDP per capita is log of PPP GDP per
capita in 2005 dollars.  Population is the log of number of people.  The number
of people killed in natural disasters (number killed) is in thousands.
z statistics in parentheses based on HAC standard errors.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 4:  Alternative Specifications27
 Dependent Variable:  World Bank disbursements
SSA LAC Others 1984-94 1995-2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
World Bank commitments 1.255*** 0.743*** 0.922*** 1.194*** 0.889***
(5.88) (5.53) (7.63) (6.50) (10.17)
US friend -0.0799 0.104 0.0517 0.0324 0.0807
(-0.96) (0.25) (0.58) (0.35) (1.10)
inflation -1.402** -0.958** -0.351 -0.691* -0.870*
(-2.91) (-2.91) (-1.23) (-2.50) (-2.02)
inflation*US friend 1.339** 0.947** 0.342 0.689* 0.857*
(3.09) (2.86) (1.18) (2.51) (1.98)
% ) exchange rate 0.163*** -0.122 0.109*** 0.274*** 0.109***
(6.97) (-0.05) (3.38) (5.09) (3.62)
% ) exchange rate*US friend -0.252* 0.116 -0.0793* -0.279*** -0.0789**
(-2.11) (0.05) (-2.46) (-5.01) (-2.60)
year -0.00287 -0.00663 0.00892 -0.0593 0.0247
(-0.40) (-1.03) (1.12) (-4.36) (2.57)
R
2 0.3471 0.2546 0.2438 0.2682 0.1628
N 462 260 376 487 600
Countries 34 22 41 76 83
Estimated with country fixed effects.
Disbursements and commitments are log of constant 2005 dollars.
z statistics in parentheses based on HAC standard errors.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 5:  Estimation Results for Sub-samples28
Dependent Variable:  World Bank disbursements
(1) (2) (3)
World Bank commitments 0.938*** 0.994*** 1.232***
(19.95) (10.92) (9.87)
US friend 0.0241 0.0177 0.0326
(0.35) (0.26) (0.58)
inflation -0.879*** -0.675** -0.703**
(-3.70) (-2.60) (-2.71)
inflation*US friend 0.865*** 0.652* 0.700**
(3.63) (2.49) (2.69)
% ) exchange rate 0.140* 0.119** 0.134*
(2.38) (2.64) (2.34)
% ) exchange rate *US friend -0.134* -0.122** -0.139*
(-2.26) (-2.66) (-2.44)








  (1) FGLS AR1 with fixed effects
  (2) OLS Dynamic panel with HAC standard errors
  (3) Arellano-Bond GMM with robust standard errors
Disbursements and commitments are log of constant 2005 dollars.
Column 1 reports t statistics in parentheses.
Columns 2 and 3 report z statistics in parentheses.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 6:  AR1 and Dynamic Panel Estimations29
Dependent Variable:  World Bank disbursements
(1) (2)
World Bank commitments 0.847*** 0.986***
(12.55) (10.18)
US friend 0.0172 0.0132
(0.30) (0.18)




inflation*US friend 0.542*** 0.685**
(3.74) (2.73)
inflation*strong US friend 0.0210
(0.69)
% ) exchange rate 0.125*** 0.131***
(10.13) (6.11)
% ) exchange rate*US friend -0.108*** -0.115***
(-3.46) (-4.97)








  (1) Excludes observations with inflation>10, % ) exchange rate>10,
 or log (disbursements/commitments)<!4.
  (2) Full sample.
Estimated with country fixed effects.
Disbursements and commitments are log of constant 2005 dollars.
z statistics in parentheses based on HAC standard errors.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 7:  Excluding Outliers; Strong US friend30
Dependent Variable:  World Bank disbursements
(1)








% ) exchange rate -0.0189
(-1.86)







Covers only cases with NO active SAL.
Estimated with country fixed effects.
Disbursements and commitments are log of constant 2005 dollars.
z statistics in parentheses based on HAC standard errors.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Figure 3:  Sample Distribution of % ) ) ) ) Exchange Rate